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 Why even misleading identity claims matter: The evolution 
of the English Defence League 
Abstract 
When activists in radical, far or extreme right groups claim identities that set 
them apart from such analytical categories, they are usually given short shrift by 
commentators and academics, a function of the presumed strategic nature of such 
claims and the evidential inaccuracies that scrutiny of such claims often reveals. 
Such responses help ensure critical readings of these groups. However, they also 
risk overlooking the fact that, even where such identifications appear misleading, 
they may still be causally significant, shaping the group’s evolution in important 
ways. I develop this argument using the case of the English Defence League, a 
group whose activists have tended to claim they are a ‘single issue group’ 
protesting only about the supposed threats of ‘Islamification’. I demonstrate how 
their enactment of this identity, while uneven and erratic, shaped the emergent 
movement culture, tactical repertoires, intra-movement relations and, ultimately, 
the ebb and flow of movement viability. 
 
 Introduction 
When I started attending English Defence League (EDL) events, I made the same 
‘mistake’ several times.1 Not surprisingly, the activists I met wanted to know who I 
was and what my research was about – Who did I work for? Was I a journalist? 
Was this another ‘lefty hatchet job’? In response I would explain that I was an 
academic with an interest in political movements and that my project was about 
how, in spite of public opposition and hostile media coverage, the EDL had 
sustained itself for as long as it had. This way of presenting myself seemed to work: 
during a year and a half attending EDL events there were only two instances in 
which activists chose not to speak with me. Several of the people I had this 
conversation with did pick me up on one point, however. They would tell me, ‘that’s 
ok, but we’re not a political movement, we’re a single issue street 
movement/protest group’ (my paraphrasing, based on field-notes), before going on 
to tell me about their ‘single issue’, usually presented in terms of the ‘Islamification’ 
                                                   
1 After the first two incidents, both during my first demonstration observation, I made this ‘mistake’ 
intentionally on several subsequent occasions as a form of ethnographic hypothesis testing. 
 or ‘Islamisation’2 of what they considered their particular bit of the world3 and the 
threat this posed to the way of life of ‘ordinary English people’.4  
 
The tendency within the academic literature on radical, far or extreme right groups 
is to approach such identity claims as if they were fairly straightforward truth 
claims i.e. the questions put front and centre are about whether such identities are 
claimed in good faith and the extent to which ‘we’ – academics, commentators, 
policy-makers, the public – should accept them as descriptors of the groups in 
question. In most cases, the conclusion is that we ought to be sceptical, even 
suspicious, of these self-ascribed identities (e.g. Allen, 2011; Garland and 
Treadwell, 2010; Goodwin et al., 2016; Jackson, 2011; Kassimeris and Jackson, 
2015).  
 
                                                   
2 I use ‘Islamification’ in general as this was the term more frequently used by the activists I knew. 
3 The activists spoke variably about England, Britain and ‘the West’. 
4 The phrase most often used by the activists I knew to describe the wider population they identified with, 
although some also sometimes used class-based identities (see Garland and Treadwell, 2012; Winlow et al., 
2017). 
 In the case of the type of claims made by EDL activists to be a ‘single issue group’, 
scholars usually raise two concerns. First, given that such identities are used 
strategically by activists to distance themselves from more extreme right groups 
and reputationally toxic labels such as ‘racist’, ‘fascist’ and ‘Nazi’, it is possible that 
such identity claims are not being made in good faith (Garland and Treadwell, 
2010; Jackson, 2011; Mudde, 2000). Second, the concept of single issue groups or 
parties is itself problematic because it risks gross oversimplification of the issue 
frames around which such groups mobilise and the causal and motivational 
pathways through which they generate support (Mudde, 1999). In the case of the 
EDL, for example, while its activists have often claimed to be a single issue group 
protesting only about the supposed threats of Islamification, several studies have 
found that participation in EDL activism (Bartlett and Littler, 2011; Busher, 2015; 
Garland and Treadwell, 2012; Pai, 2016; Pilkington, 2016; Treadwell and Garland, 
2011; Winlow et al., 2017) and sympathy for groups such as the EDL (Goodwin et 
al., 2016; Pai, 2016; Thomas et al., 2017) is usually grounded in a wider set of 
grievances, frustrations and anxieties associated with perceptions that ‘ordinary 
English people’ are suffering ever greater political and cultural marginalisation. 
Indeed, survey evidence indicates EDL activists are often at least, if not more, 
concerned about other issues including immigration and a lack of jobs, as they are 
 about the ‘single issue’ around which they are supposedly mobilising (Bartlett and 
Littler, 2011). 
 
Such analyses have helped develop, articulate and sustain a critical reading of 
radical, far and extreme right politics – something particularly important at a time 
when, by adopting new forms and mobilising around new issue frames, some such 
movements have gained significant traction within ‘mainstream’ political arenas 
(Bruter and Harrison, 2011; Minkenberg, 2013). They have also inhibited the 
adoption of overly simplistic accounts of how such groups build support e.g. by 
making clear that the EDL is not simply a product of current anti-Muslim 
sentiment (especially Goodwin et al., 2016; Winlow et al., 2017).  
 
They do however risk overlooking a basic but important point: the wider literature 
on collective identities and social movements (e.g. Hunt and Benford, 2004; 
Jensen, 1995; Melucci, 1995; Polletta and Jasper, 2001) indicates that regardless of 
whether we consider it objectively accurate to describe a group such as the EDL as 
a ‘single issue group’, the fact activists identify in this way may nonetheless have 
significant implications in terms of the group’s tactical and ideological evolution 
and intra-group dynamics, and in terms of individuals’ journeys through such 
 groups. As such, while it is important to question whether such identity claims 
provide us with an accurate picture of these groups, there are also other questions 
that we could and should be asking e.g. How are these collective identities 
constructed and performed within the activist community, by whom, how 
consistently and under what circumstances? How and to what extent has the 
performance of these collective identities shaped the evolution of the group(s) in 
terms of its ideology, tactical repertoire, alliances and intra-group dynamics? What 
has happened when (some) activists’ have challenged this collective identity? 
 
In this article I demonstrate how paying greater attention to such questions can 
help us better understand how radical, far or extreme right groups function and 
evolve. I do this by tracing how EDL activists’ identification as a ‘single issue group’ 
protesting against the ‘Islamification’ of their country shaped the evolution of the 
EDL and the UK’s contemporary anti-minority protest scene at micro-, meso- and 
macro-levels. In other words, I trace how such identifications shaped individual 
journeys through activism, the emergent movement culture and, more broadly, the 
‘ebb and flow’ of the EDL’s ‘organisational viability’.5 The aim of doing so is not to 
                                                   
5 A term borrowed from Zald and Ash Garner (1987: 123) 
 argue that we should simply accept activists’ self-ascribed identities as descriptors 
of their group, or that the EDL is ‘best’ understood as a single issue group, but to 
argue that such identifications are important ‘social facts’ (Durkheim, 2013[1895]) 
and that by treating them as such – i.e. by examining their possible causal 
significance for other phenomena – we can enhance our ability to understand and 
explain the trajectory of radical, far and extreme right politics. 
 
This article is grounded in data generated during sixteen months of overt 
ethnographic research undertaken with EDL activists in and around London during 
2011-12. This comprised observation at demonstrations, meetings, memorial 
events, charity fundraisers, court cases and social events throughout this period; 
detailed activist life history interviews with 18 individuals; and observation of 
public and private social media conversations during and beyond the period of 
research. Frequent contact with several of the activists continued until the autumn 
of 2013, and occasional email, telephone or social media contact continues with 
some activists at the time of writing. Permission to undertake observation was 
sought from local gatekeepers within the organisation and the purpose of the 
research explained on first contact with all members of the group as far as was 
possible within the context of often chaotic protest events. Informed written 
 consent was provided for all formal interviews. The nature of the research – an 
ethnography centred on a small part of a national movement – meant it had a fairly 
narrow geographic focus. Ethnographies in other parts of the country (Pilkington, 
2016; Quinn, 2015; Winlow et al., 2017) provide valuable points of comparison.  
 
The next section provides an overview of the EDL and the wider anti-Muslim6 
protest scene since the group’s emergence in 2009. After that, I set out the 
theoretical foundations of the argument developed in this article before discussing 
a) how EDL organisers and grassroots activists enacted their single-issue-protest-
group identity and b) the implications of the enactment of this for the evolution of 
the EDL.  
 
An overview of the EDL and the UK’s anti-Muslim protest 
scene, 2009-2016  
The EDL came to prominence in the summer of 2009 with a series of street 
protests, several of which were characterised by significant public disorder, 
                                                   
6 Pilkington (2016) prefers ‘anti-Islam’. 
 including clashes between EDL activists and an assortment of anti-fascist/racist 
campaigners and local youths, mainly from minority ethnic communities (Blake, 
2011; Copsey, 2010). The group initially drew much of its support from established 
football violence networks (Copsey, 2010) or from among those who had ‘retired’ 
from football violence (Busher, 2015: 41). It soon attracted support from other 
constituencies, however, including the established extreme right and people 
already engaged with the so-called counter-jihad movement (see Mulhall and 
Lowles, 2015), as well as a significant number of people who had not been involved 
with any of these protest or football scenes but found themselves drawn to the EDL, 
usually through a combination of sympathy for the cause, personal contacts and the 
allure of a rambunctious day out (Busher, 2015: 38-73; Copsey, 2010; Meadowcroft 
and Morrow, 2016; Pilkington, 2016). By the end of 2009 and for much of 2010 
and 2011 the group was regularly able to muster in excess of 1,000 supporters for 
demonstrations around the country; events that often cost local authorities and the 
police hundreds of thousands of pounds to manage (Allchorn, 2016). Bartlett and 
Littler (2011) estimate that, as of mid-2011, as many as 25,000 people had 
participated in an EDL demonstration. The EDL also built a substantial online 
following, with Facebook followers alone exceeding 100,000 at several points. 
 
 The EDL has operated through a loose network of local divisions, most with their 
own Facebook page. There have in addition been youth divisions, a women’s 
division and ‘special interest’ divisions such as an ‘LGBT division’, a ‘Jewish 
division’ and a division for ‘persecuted Christians’, among others. As local divisions 
proliferated, regional coordinators were introduced to provide organisational 
structure, but these structures remained ‘loose and chaotic’ (Copsey, 2010: 6; see 
also Robinson, 2015). It is common, for example, to find uncertainty among 
activists about who their regional organiser is, or even which region their division 
belongs to (Pilkington, 2016: 37-59). External (movement) and internal (divisional) 
boundaries have also tended to be highly porous, with people able to join and leave 
divisions and the movement with relative ease (Busher, 2015: 45-6; Pilkington, 
2016: 60-91), something not in keeping with conventional extreme right 
movements (Bjørgo, 1998; Wasmund, 1986) 
 
Until October 2013, the national structures centred on Luton, a town about half an 
hour by train north of London. The town had been the scene of a series of 
demonstrations in early 2009 that generated the initial momentum for the 
formation of the group (Copsey, 2010). The Luton-based national leadership 
quickly became the main focus of media attention, with a BBC documentary, 
 Young, British and Angry, initially turning Kevin Carroll into the de facto face of 
the EDL. The media spotlight subsequently shifted onto his cousin, Tommy 
Robinson (aka Stephen Lennon), a high-energy, fast-talking, all-action character 
whose combination of swagger, self-deprecation and derring-do helped make him a 
popular figurehead within the movement. However, the local divisions operated 
with considerable autonomy, identifying local issues around which to mobilise and 
in some cases developing quite distinct local organisational cultures – something 
that would eventually contribute to the fragmentation of the movement (Busher, 
2015: 123-56). 
 
From the outset, EDL activists found themselves embroiled in a protracted 
‘framing contest’ (Ryan, 1991) with their critics. Anti-fascists, media commentators 
and academics alike usually described the EDL as a ‘far right’, ‘extreme right’ or 
‘racist’ group: albeit opinions differed about the degree of organisational and 
ideological continuity between the EDL and the established extreme right (Copsey, 
2010; Jackson, 2011; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015). In response, EDL activists 
pointed out that there were EDL activists from black and minority ethnic 
backgrounds; that there were banners on EDL demonstrations with slogans such as 
‘black and white unite against Islamic extremism’; that speakers at EDL 
 demonstrations repeatedly denounced established extreme right groups; and that 
EDL organisers had even published a video of themselves burning a swastika flag 
(Garland and Treadwell, 2010). They argued that it didn’t make sense to call them 
race-ist because ‘Islam is not a race’ (Busher, 2015: 100; Pilkington, 2016: 106-7). 
The extent to which such arguments gained credence beyond EDL activists and a 
small coterie of supporters is difficult to gauge (Thomas et al., 2017; 
YouGov/Extremis, 2012). What is important in the context of this article however 
is that at least some activists were persuaded by their own arguments and did not 
identify, even in private, as racist or extreme right (Busher, 2015: 97-122; 
Pilkington, 2016: 92-124; Winlow et al., 2017: 75-108). 
 
The EDL began to lose momentum in 2011 as intra-movement friction came to the 
surface. A full discussion of this friction goes beyond the scope of this article; 
suffice to say that as well as ideological tensions, there were regional rivalries, 
tactical disagreements, a resurgence of old football and sectarian enmities, and a 
proliferation of personal squabbles and resentments (Busher, 2015: 123-56; 
Lowles, 2012). Groups that had largely been allies of the EDL, such as Casuals 
United and March for England, began to reassert their differences, and factions 
crystallised into splinter groups such as the North-West Infidels, North-East 
 Infidels, South-East Alliance and Combined Ex-Forces. This resulted in a 
fragmented scene, characterised by smaller demonstrations and seemingly endless 
recriminations and in-fighting, often played out on social media to the undisguised 
glee of their opponents. There was a brief resurgence of the group’s fortunes during 
the summer of 2013, following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby by two Islamist 
extremists in Woolwich, London (Pilkington, 2016: 37-59; Innes et al., 2016). This 
was however short-lived. In October of that year Robinson and Carrol resigned 
from the EDL, a move they claimed was motivated partly by concerns that the EDL 
was being taken over by extreme right elements (Gover, 2013).  
 
This wave of anti-minority activism did not peter out altogether, however. The EDL 
and various cognate groups continue to organise demonstrations, albeit smaller 
ones, as well as a range of other protest activities, such as Britain First’s ‘Christian 
Patrols’ (Allen, 2014). There have been indications of significant tactical and 
ideological radicalisation of splinter groups such as the North-West Infidels and 
South-East Alliance, some of whose activists have undertaken serious physical 
assaults on opponents, collaborated with the extreme-right National Front (NF) 
and peppered their Facebook pages with references to the ‘fourteen words’ of white 
supremacism. Meanwhile, other activists from the EDL have turned their energies 
 to campaigning around issues such as ‘Brexit’ (Archibald, 2016), various veterans 
causes, or forging alliances with the German-based group PEGIDA (Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident, initials in German) (Goldberg, 
2016). 
 
The emergent nature of movement cultures and the power of 
collective identity 
The discussion and arguments developed in this article are grounded in three basic 
theoretical ideas that have been amply demonstrated in the literature on social 
movements and contentious politics. First, movement cultures – i.e. their tactical 
repertoires and tastes (Jasper, 2007; Tilly, 2008), issue frames (Benford and Snow, 
2000), collective identities (Hunt and Benford, 2004; Polletta and Jasper, 2001), 
emotional repertoires and ‘rhythms’ (Summers-Effler, 2010), normative orders 
(Busher and Morrison, 2016), aesthetics (Miller-Idriss, 2014), and even activists’ 
interpretation of their own motives (Snow et al., 1980; Wright Mills, 1940) – are 
emergent. Movement cultures, like the cultures of other social groups or collectives 
(see Fine, 2010; Goffman, 1967), can change over time as they are affirmed, 
negotiated, challenged and policed through activists’ interactions with one another 
 and with their various opponents and allies, obstacles and opportunities (Blee, 
2012; Jasper, 2007). 
 
Second, changes in one element of the movement culture entail adjustments in 
other elements of the movement culture (Jasper, 2007: 181-266). If, for example, 
activists’ interpretation of ‘the problem’ expands e.g. instead of seeing their 
putative problems as being caused by the ineptitude or corruption of local 
politicians they begin to see them as the product of a larger coordinated plot to 
alter society, it is likely that the targeting of their actions will change to reflect this, 
and new strategies of action may be required. This may lead activists to rethink 
what comprises a legitimate strategy of action, prompting further reflection on and 
reframing of ‘who is to blame’, and so forth (Blee, 2012: 81-108). 
 
Third, emergent movement cultures, including the stories that activists tell 
themselves about who they are and what they represent, shape the practices, 
cognitions and emotions of movement participants, sometimes in dramatic ways 
(Jasper, 2007: 69-99; Swidler, 1995). Crudely put, activism changes people, and 
the specific nature of these changes depends on the characteristics of the group 
culture in which they are participants. 
  
In the remainder of this article I demonstrate how these basic theoretical 
propositions are borne out in the case of the EDL. In doing so I argue that, even 
where we consider activists’ identity claims to be (even wilfully) misleading, it is 
important to recognise that they can still be causally significant i.e. they can have a 
bearing on how the group evolves and on individual journeys through activism. 
 
The enactment of activists’ ‘single issue protest group’ 
identity  
All the activists I met were aware of the potential strategic benefits of identifying as 
a ‘single issue protest group’. They believed that defining themselves in this way 
differentiated them organisationally and ideologically from established extreme 
right political parties such as the British National Party (BNP) and the NF, and 
believed, or at least hoped, that the nature of their ‘single issue’ would insulate 
them from accusations of racism, at least in the minds of some of the general 
public. They were also aware that their claims to be ‘not political’ played on an anti-
politics zeitgeist that extends well beyond the social and political fringe (see Hay, 
2007). What is important in the context of this article however is not the 
 motivation for, or perceived benefits of, such identifications, but whether and how 
they were enacted, in which contexts and under what conditions. 
 
EDL activism has taken place across a range of more or less public and managed 
spaces. These have included official street demonstrations of varying size, unofficial 
or ‘flash’ demonstrations, petitions against mosques, leafleting campaigns, 
attempted boycotts of restaurants selling halal food, organisational social media 
pages, the personal social media pages of activists, memorials for symbolically 
significant events, and various charity fundraisers. The social spaces associated 
with each of these activities have been characterised by subtly different behavioural 
norms and social rules – a product of the fact that different activities have brought 
together slightly different configurations of actors, audiences, opponents, symbols 
and interests (Busher and Morrison, 2016).Yet activists’ identification as part of a 
single issue protest group permeated the emergent behavioural norms and social 
rules of all of these spaces to a greater or lesser degree. 
 
As might be expected given the anticipated strategic importance of presenting 
themselves as a single issue protest group, the enactment of this identity was 
particularly evident in more public facing and managed spaces of activism, such as 
 marches and official social media pages. In the case of marches and 
demonstrations it would begin during the build-up, as national and regional 
leaders justified the particular march in terms that clearly emphasised the group’s 
supposed single issue focus e.g. it was in response to plans for a new ‘mega-
mosque’, to highlight the activities of ‘Muslim grooming gangs’, challenge the 
supposedly unfettered activities of ‘extremist preachers’ etc. This identity 
enactment would then continue during the event. The vast majority of speeches 
centred on the issue of Islamification, albeit there were sometimes references to 
intersecting themes including the dangers of ‘political correctness’ and the 
supposedly venal politics of ‘the left’; activists’ placards usually bore slogans 
relating specifically to Islam and Muslims; and common chants such as ‘10 Muslim 
bombers’7 and ‘Allah is a paedo’ also reflected this focus of attention. There was 
often racist shouting from some activists and occasional displays of extreme right 
symbols in the form of pin-badges, insignia on clothing, tattoos and very 
occasionally a straight-arm salute. However, in most instances such ‘breaches’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967) of the performance of their group identity were policed by event 
stewards who would intervene to curtail such actions (Busher, 2013). 
                                                   
7 Sung to the tune of 10 Green Bottles 
  
It is a similar story with the EDL’s website and official social media pages. When 
the EDL first posted a full mission statement early in 2011, they did so under the 
headline ‘Peacefully protesting Militant Islam’, and each of their five primary 
points (‘Human Rights’, ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’, ‘Public Education’, 
‘Respecting Tradition’ and ‘International Outlook’) were articulated with reference 
to the supposed threat of the global diffusion of ‘militant Islam’ and ‘sharia’. 
Meanwhile, administrators on the group’s online forums sought to inculcate a 
culture that reflected the single-issue-group identity. Administrators on local and 
regional Facebook pages in London and the Southeast spent several hours each 
week moderating divisional Facebook walls, promoting discussion of ‘EDL issues’ 
and deleting comments they deemed inappropriate. As one London organiser 
recalled,  
 
I’d get up in the morning and I’d man the Facebook wall for the day. I’d search 
around for EDL-related stories and if you ever looked at the London page it was 
fairly sharp and it was just EDL stuff, I mean nothing else, and I tried to find 
educational pieces for people: things that, you know, explain to you about different 
 kinds of Islam, the different Islamic sects and explained about Muslims Against 
Crusades [a now proscribed group led by Anjem Choudary]. (Andy)8   
 
After Robinson and Carroll left the EDL there were indications that the group’s 
issue frame might broaden. In February 2014 the EDL announced that their 
mission statement would be adjusted to include reference to ‘mass immigration’, 
and on 19th July 2014 an EDL demonstration in Hexthorpe, South Yorkshire, was 
organised around the theme of Roma immigration. As of the summer of 2016, 
however, the demonstration in Hexthorpe remains an outlier and, while the EDL 
mission statement has been adjusted to include a position on immigration 
(Pilkington, 2016: 124), ‘the struggle against global Islamification’ continues to be 
foregrounded in these official and public spaces. 
 
More importantly for the purposes of this article, activists’ identification as a single 
issue group also permeated into the ‘backstage’ (Mudde, 2000; Jackson, 2011) 
spaces of the group – those spaces where activists were less exposed to, or thought 
they were less exposed to, the scrutiny of the public, the media and their 
                                                   
8 All names used are pseudonyms, except for those referring to people in leadership positions. 
 opponents. During private meetings, for example, activists sometimes used 
language and expressed opinions they were usually reluctant to express in more 
public spaces – such as ‘off the record’ comments about ‘being fed up with all the 
fucking immigrants’,9 comments about how they would like the EDL to start 
mobilising around other issues, including ‘mass immigration’ and ‘anti-white 
racism’, and more frequent use of terms such as ‘Pakis’. Yet the enactment of their 
single-issue-protest-group identity did not dissolve altogether. At the meetings I 
attended, activists making speeches or leading discussions consistently reiterated 
the focus on Islam, or even ‘militant Islam’, and during activists’ conversations 
about their cause (i.e. when not engaged in movement gossip, discussions about 
current affairs or football, or revelling in tales of previous events) the focus of 
attention remained largely on topics such as new mosques being built in their area, 
the latest activities of Muslims Against Crusades, and stories of their own recent 
confrontations with Muslims. The main exception to this were references to left-
wing or anti-racist groups, but these were conceived of as part of the ‘single issue’ 
since the ‘liberal left’ was deemed culpable for the government’s supposed failure to 
challenge Islamification. Similarly, when activists made reference to sources other 
                                                   
9 Fieldnotes from a regional EDL meeting, London, 26th February 2012. 
 than mainstream news media these were almost invariably websites, blogs or other 
publications associated with the counter-jihad movement. References to 
publications associated with established extreme right groups were conspicuous by 
their absence. In the spring and summer of 2011 regional organisers in London 
were even planning to develop training about Islam for divisional leaders, and two 
members of the leadership team were designated to advise activists on whether or 
not specific Islamic groups should be considered ‘extremist’, and therefore 
warranting the EDL’s attention. 
 
Even during informal conversations e.g. on the way to and from demonstrations, 
during social events or charity fundraisers, there was evidence that activists had 
internalised the single-issue-group identity and engaged in forms of self-policing. 
Once they hit their rhetorical stride, it was common for activists to reach beyond 
complaints ostensibly focused on Islam and Muslims to a more general lament that 
ranged across themes including immigration, overcrowded social housing, benefit 
fraud and, in the months after the English riots of August 2011, the supposed links 
between ‘black culture’ and a decline in law and order. They would however 
repeatedly return to the core EDL themes, making clear that where they had 
strayed from those themes they were ‘just my opinions’. This was even the case 
 among activists whose personal concerns were not aligned with the official EDL 
position. For example Geoff, a former BNP and NF activist, regularly expressed 
frustration at the relatively narrow issue frame adopted by the EDL and 
occasionally when drunk after a march would surreptitiously perform a Nazi salute, 
but always accompanied such comments or actions with an acknowledgement that 
his views were not representative of the EDL or of most of his co-activists. 
 
Where breaches of these emergent group norms took place, they usually incurred 
some form of sanction (see also Pilkington, 2016: 97-99). In most cases these were 
relatively subtle, especially when breaches happened in private spaces (e.g. 
divisional meetings or informal conversations) or when they comprised a fairly 
minor infraction. This could be in the form of ‘a quiet word’. Phil, one of the 
younger and more vocal activists in the London area, remembered how on one 
occasion after he had made overtly racist comments during a social event one of the 
older activists ‘took me to one side’ to speak to him about his views – ‘just because 
you’ve had one bad experience it don’t mean like you should go running about and 
hating all black people’. Other forms of mild sanction could simply be that their 
comments received a more lukewarm or ambivalent response from their co-
activists than, say, comments more specifically about Islam and Muslims – e.g. less 
 clearly expressed verbal support from co-activists, co-activists swiftly moving on to 
another topic, or an awkward half agreement from the group.  
 
Where breaches were more public or considered more serious, such as racist 
chanting on demonstrations or the performance of straight-arm salutes, sanctions 
could be more forceful, ranging from a public ‘bollocking’ (Pilkington, 2016: 107), 
to expulsion from the movement, physical intimidation or even violence. For 
example, the banning of Bill Baker, leader of the English Nationalist Alliance and a 
prominent figure in the London area until early 2011, from all EDL events, was due 
at least partly to a perception that comments he made during a televised debate 
had ‘racist connotations’.10  Similarly, after a photograph emerged of an individual 
performing a Nazi salute during an EDL march in London in October 2011, activists 
across the region expressed outrage and worked together to try to identify the 
individual and proscribe him from future events.   
 
                                                   
10 Recovered from ‘The EDL and the JTF’, Gates of Vienna, 1st March 2010, 
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/edl-and-jtf.html. (Accessed 1 March, 2017) 
 In sum, while there are good reasons to be sceptical about the idea that the EDL is 
a single issue group protesting only about the supposed threats of Islamification, 
once we get up close to the practices that constitute EDL activism we can see that 
this aspect of activists’ collective identity has nonetheless had a significant bearing 
on the group’s emergent culture, shaping behavioural norms and expectations 
across most, if not all, spaces in which EDL activism took place.  
 
Implications for the evolution of anti-minority protest 
The emergent behavioural norms and expectations described above have had a 
number of tangible implications for the evolution of the EDL and anti-minority 
protest in the UK. 
 
Patterns of recruitment 
One of the most obvious implications concerns patterns of recruitment, particularly 
during the initial period of movement growth. While the EDL has attracted known 
extreme right activists, it was also initially relatively successful in attracting people 
who did not identify with the extreme right (Bartlett and Littler, 2011), including 
 some who identified as being explicitly opposed to such groups (Busher, 2015: 38-
74; Pai, 2016). Indeed, when the EDL was at its peak, individuals identifying with 
or who had long associations with the established extreme right comprised a 
minority of the group’s supporters (Busher, 2015; Bartlett and Littler, 2011; 
Pilkington, 2016).  
 
The ability of the EDL to attract people who did not identify with the extreme right 
was fundamental to the group’s initial momentum (Copsey, 2010), which in turn 
served to attract further interest and support (Busher, 2015: 58-59). It also had a 
multiplier effect: the fact that prospective activists who did not identify with the 
extreme right tended to meet other people who identified in similar ways when 
they attended their first EDL events made it easier for them to engage with group. 
A recurring theme in interviews and informal conversations with activists who did 
not identify with the extreme right was that part of what persuaded them to join the 
EDL was meeting other EDL supporters who were ‘ordinary English people’ rather 
than the ‘thugs and racists’ they had heard about on the television. 
 
The recruitment of people from beyond existing extreme right scenes is likely to 
have consequences that extend well beyond the duration of the EDL. Evidence 
 indicates that people who have already participated in social or political 
mobilisations are more likely to do so in the future than those who have not 
(Corrigall-Brown, 2012; McAdam, 1989). It is quite possible that the EDL has 
socialised a cohort of people into contentious politics who otherwise would have 
been unlikely to be involved with such activities (Lowles, 2012). 
 
Activists’ personal ideological trajectories 
As might be expected in a radical protest movement (Davies, 2008), most of the 
activists I encountered had a highly binary interpretation of the world, seeing 
themselves as engaged in a millennial struggle between good and evil – an 
existential fight for the future of their country and culture. Of importance for the 
argument of this article, however, their interpretation of this struggle usually had a 
quite specific ideological or discursive texture. Most activists rarely, and in some 
cases never, framed their cause in terms of biologically defined race, even during 
private conversations. Where activists did express more general anti-minority and 
anti-foreigner sentiments, Islam and Muslims were almost always identified as 
posing a particularly acute and intractable threat. The exceptions to this were 
usually among activists who had come to the EDL via established extreme right 
 groups, or activists who identified primarily with other factions/organisations (see 
also Pilkington, 2016).  
 
Some activists even claimed that involvement in the EDL had helped them move 
away from the extreme right and associated racist attitudes and dispositions (see 
also Pilkington, 2016: 107). Phil, for example, told me, 
 
I wasn’t completely racist before I started, but I had a lot more right-wing views . . . 
But then once I started with the EDL, I turned that all around and to this day I’ve 
got black friends that I talk to in work and get on with and have a laugh with, and 
I’ve actually completely turned things around and now I’m just standing against 
one thing, and that’s the one thing that we see as a problem. (Phil) 
 
The idea of somebody turning away from racism by joining a group such as the 
EDL might seem preposterous to some people. Yet it is quite possible to see how 
Phil could interpret his own ideological journey in this way. Furthermore, research 
on the intersection of protest narratives, collective identities and emotions in other 
movements (e.g. Blee, 2012: 81-108; Goodwin et al., 2001) supports the idea that 
activists’ exposure to and participation in the intensive circulation and 
 consumption of information focused heavily on the supposed threat of 
Islamification might, in some cases, have resulted in them becoming increasingly 
entrained, cognitively and emotionally, with this specific issue. In other words, 
some EDL activists may have experienced, at least temporarily, a shift in the object 
of their fear, anger and hostility from a more general focus on perceived non-
British/English/Western Others to a more specific and articulated focus on 
Muslims. Interestingly, as the EDL fragmented, the Facebook pages of some of the 
activists I had known, particularly those who became aligned with the South-East 
Alliance, increasingly featured content from extreme right groups as well as white 
power symbols and slogans. 
 
Movement leadership 
A third area in which activists’ single-issue-group identity had clear implications 
was the distribution of leadership positions. 
 
Part of the attraction of EDL activism was a sense that everybody could become a 
somebody within this scene (Busher, 2015). The activists I met acquired status in a 
number of ways: a reputation for being brave and loyal; their proximity to national 
 leaders; or a reputation for being well-informed about Islam. What stands out 
however is that leadership positions were largely occupied by activists who 
subscribed to and promoted the idea that the EDL was a single issue protest group. 
At the national level, Robinson and Carroll, and subsequently Tim Ablitt and Steve 
Eddowes,11 have broadly sustained this position, sometimes in the face of 
opposition from within the movement. 
 
To some extent this has also been the case at the local and regional levels, 
particularly within the divisions most closely aligned with the national leadership, 
as was the case in London. Here, between 2011 and 2013, all of the local or regional 
organisers were able, and appeared comfortable, to articulate the view that the EDL 
was focused only on ‘militant Islam’ and Islamification, and were willing to 
challenge the sometimes overtly racist positions of some co-activists.12  
 
                                                   
11 Chairs of the leadership committee after Robinson and Carroll resigned. 
12 Although see Pilkington’s (2016: 97-9) discussion of some activists’ frustrations that such disciplining was 
not particularly systematic or effective. 
 The collective enactment of activists’ single-issue-group identity helped consolidate 
these individuals as leaders because, to borrow from Goffman (1967), they were the 
main winners from the deference rules inscribed in the group’s emergent culture. 
They were the individuals who were given the microphone during demonstrations, 
the floor during meetings, and whose observations and comments received the 
most consistently positive feedback from co-activists. By contrast, activists who 
strayed too far from the theme of Islamification, particularly during public events, 
were rarely invited to speak publicly or at meetings again, thereby inhibiting their 
chances of coming to be recognised as movement leaders.  
 
A similar dynamic took place within the movement nationally. Robinson and 
Carroll by and large favoured local and regional organisers who adopted a similar 
position to themselves, and marginalised those13 who undermined the single-issue-
group identity by, for example, forming or advocating alliances with established 
extreme right groups or adopting slogans and symbols derived from conventional 
                                                   
13 Such as John ‘Snowy’ Shaw, who became a leading figure within the Infidels, and later Paul Pitt, who 
established the South-East Alliance. 
 extreme right positions – an approach that exacerbated regional rivalries and 
contributed to the splits that characterised the EDL from 2011 onwards. 
 
Action repertoire and alliances 
This introduces a fourth area where activists’ single-issue-group identity had 
implications: the EDL’s action repertoire – e.g. the consistent targeting of protest 
activities at objects and issues with clear symbolic linkages to the themes of Islam 
and Islamification, and non-adoption of electoral campaigning – and decisions 
about the alliances that they did, or did not, make. An ill-fated attempt by 
Robinson and Carroll to create an alliance with the British Freedom Party (BFP), a 
very small party that emerged out of a split from the BNP in 2010, provides a good 
example. 
  
The proposal to forge this alliance was made in the autumn of 2011, as support for 
street demonstrations waned and the disputes between the EDL leadership and the 
Infidels sapped movement morale. The response from grassroots activists was 
however far from positive, with all but a handful expressing reticence or even 
outright opposition to the move. The single-issue-protest-group identity was 
 integral to this opposition. First, some activists expressed concern that an alliance 
with the BFP would make it harder for them to persuade the public that the EDL 
was not a extreme right group because, as one activist succinctly put it, ‘BFP is too 
similar to BNP’ (Susan). Second, activists argued that they had chosen to join a 
street movement, not a political party. They saw themselves as ‘the feet on the 
street’ (Susan), ‘the ones who actually get the job done’ (Bev), and several had been 
attracted to the EDL precisely because the group was ‘getting out and actually 
doing something’.14 Linking to a political party just did not fit with this sense of 
who they were. Meanwhile, several activists who did support parties such as the 
BNP expressed concern that this would ‘split the nationalist vote’. 
 
Movement cohesion and its limitations  
Finally, activists’ identification as a single issue group also played an important role 
in forging and fraying movement cohesion. Since social movements usually 
comprise ‘an uneasy coalition between groups favouring different tactics, often 
with slightly different moral sensibilities [which] have little to do with each other, 
                                                   
14 A common theme in interviews with activists regardless of the route they had taken into EDL activism 
 even dislike each other’ (Jasper, 2007: 229), one of the main challenges for any 
nascent movement is to develop and sustain a sense of collective identity and a 
shared interpretation of ‘what the problem is’ (Blee, 2012; Melucci, 1995).  
 
The EDL certainly had its share of seemingly unlikely alliances. Long-term football 
hooligans marched alongside people waving gay pride flags, and people who had 
until recently been part of the extreme right scene stood next to people holding 
Israel flags. Furthermore, while most activists would, when asked directly, provide 
a similar initial explanation of what they were protesting about – the threat of 
Islamification and the loss of the way of life of ‘ordinary English people’ – the EDL 
in fact provided a home for people with a range of different interests and 
ideological positions (Taylor, 2010). There were activists who still identified with 
groups such as the BNP and NF, but also activists who identified as anti-racists; 
there were activists who linked their cause to a Christian identity, and others who 
were passionate atheists; there were activists who interpreted their struggle in 
parochial national terms, and others who interpreted their struggle as a global 
struggle between Islam and the West; and while some activists’ anti-Muslim 
positions elided with wider anti-minority positions, including anti-Semitism, 
 others enthusiastically embraced elements of Zionism (Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 
2016). 
 
Activists’ single-issue-group identity, and their enactment of it, played an 
important role in achieving a basic level of group cohesion in at least two ways.15 
First, the single-issue-group identity neutralised, at least temporarily, some of the 
more obvious ideological tensions by ensuring activists only had to identify a very 
limited area of ideological common ground. Second, it enabled activists of different 
ideological persuasions to undertake important forms of personal identity 
management. EDL activists who were supportive of extreme right political parties, 
such as Geoff, told themselves that the EDL was campaigning about a worthwhile, 
if overly narrow, cause, and that since the EDL was just a protest group it was not 
in direct competition with the political parties with which they were affiliated. 
Indeed, some saw it as a useful recruiting ground for ‘proper extreme right-wing 
                                                   
15 Also important were the powerful and specific bonds of solidarity produced through shared participation in 
collective action (Busher, 2015; Pilkington, 2016) and the cultivation of both anti-elite enmity and shared 
identification as part of an increasingly ignored working class (a cross-cutting theme in the literature, but see 
especially Pilkington, 2016: 154-76; Winlow et al., 2017)  
 groups’.16 Meanwhile, those who did not identify with the extreme right were able 
to justify marching alongside known extreme right activists on the grounds that 
they were only in agreement on this particular issue. Some even claimed that they 
were helping to undermine the extreme right by providing an opportunity for 
people who might otherwise have joined such groups to express ‘legitimate’ 
grievances and patriotic sentiments. Even as the EDL began to fall apart, this sense 
of a common cause acted as a break on the group’s fragmentation, with activists 
from opposing factions or those who had drifted away occasionally coming together 
again around events that brought this cause into focus – as happened briefly after 
the killing of Lee Rigby.  
 
Yet while the single-issue-group identity had facilitated group cohesion, it also 
placed limits on the extent to which the EDL could adapt to and accommodate the 
evolving interests of its activists. In any movement, activists’ interpretive frames 
are likely to shift over time (Benford, 1997). The EDL was no exception. As some 
activists developed new interests, and others rekindled old interests, there were 
growing calls from parts of the activist community to mobilise around a wider set of 
                                                   
16 A phrase used by Tim, a long-term activist within the NF and Combat 18, among others. 
 issues, including ‘mass immigration’ and ‘anti-white racism’, and for the EDL to 
work more closely with other groups, some of which were part of, or were openly 
collaborating with, the established extreme right. These calls were largely resisted, 
or only partially accommodated, as the EDL leadership and a significant proportion 
of grassroots activists continued to frame themselves essentially as a single issue 
group and disassociate with the extreme right. As might be expected, this became a 
source of frustration among activists who did want to expand the focus of the EDL, 
some of whom joined up with other groups and breakaway factions, often 
generating recriminations and resentments as they did so.  
 
Conclusions 
Most scholars of the radical, far or extreme right are committed to challenging such 
movements and mitigating their deleterious effects on society. It is not surprising 
therefore that analytical attention has been concentrated on developing critical 
readings of how activists in such groups define themselves. The argument made in 
this article is not that we should cease to pursue such critical readings, but that 
these should not come at the cost of overlooking how activists’ claimed identities 
may, and often do, shape the trajectory of these groups.  Even where we might 
 consider these claimed identities to be potentially misleading, they may still 
constitute an integral part of the emergent movement culture because, in the very 
act of activists asserting these identities, they become a social fact i.e. they become 
part of an emergent social structure or narrative that shapes activists’ thoughts, 
behaviours, feelings and interactions (Jenson, 1995). 
 
In the case of the EDL, it is clear that the idea that they are a single issue group 
protesting only about the threat of Islamification is problematic. Apart from 
obvious questions about whether such identity claims are made in good faith, there 
can be little doubt the EDL was not simply a product of hostility towards Islam or 
Muslims. The relative success of the group in generating and sustaining support 
also owed much to the way it worked on broader xenophobic attitudes and 
dispositions (Goodwin et al., 2016) and tapped deep feelings of social, and often 
class-based, marginalisation and enmity towards political elites (Pilkington 2016: 
154-76; Winlow et al., 2017). Rather than a ‘single issue group’, we might be better 
thinking of the EDL as a ‘lightning rod’ for a range of different interests (Taylor, 
2010), albeit these to some extent dovetailed through the prism of anti-Muslim or 
anti-Islam positions. Yet as described above, activists’ single-issue-group identity 
nonetheless had a profound effect on the emergent movement culture and, 
 consequently, on the evolution of the EDL and the UK’s anti-minority protest 
scene, affecting patterns of recruitment, movement leadership, alliances and intra-
group relations, as well as influencing individuals’ ideological trajectories and, 
ultimately, the ebb and flow of movement viability. While research to date has 
described the prominence of this identity within EDL activism (especially Busher, 
2013; 2015; Pilkington 2016), this article has set out and theorised how such 
identities permeated almost all aspects of the group, shaping both its development 
and decline. 
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